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Abstract
Violent conflicts, particularly at election times in Africa, are a common cause of
instability and economic disruption. This paper studies how firms react to electoral
violence using the case of Kenyan flower exporters during the 2008 post-election vio-
lence as an example. The violence induced a large negative supply shock that reduced
exports primarily through workers’ absence and had heterogeneous effects: larger firms
and those with direct contractual relationships in export markets suffered smaller pro-
duction and losses of workers. On the demand side, global buyers were not able to shift
sourcing to Kenyan exporters located in areas not directly affected by the violence nor
to neighboring Ethiopian suppliers. Consistent with difficulties in insuring against
supply-chain risk disruptions caused by electoral violence, firms in direct contractual
relationships ramp up shipments just before the subsequent 2013 presidential election
to mitigate risk.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, political instability is a potentially major hindrance to firm performance.
In the African context, violent conflicts, particularly at election times, are a common cause
of instability and disruption (see, Bates, 2001, 2008). During the period from 1990 to 2018,
23% of the 348 elections which took place in Sub-Saharan Africa witnessed post-electoral
violence (see Figure [1]).
Cross-country studies (see, e.g., Alesina et al., 1996; Collier, 2007; Glick and Taylor,
2010) show that violent conflicts have negative effects on growth, investment, and trade at
the macro level. Micro-level evidence on the impact of violence on economic activity through
firms’ operations − necessary to understand the underlying mechanisms and formulate ap-
propriate policies − remains limited. There are two major empirical challenges to providing
micro-level evidence: (i) gathering detailed information on the operations of firms before,
during, and after the conflict, and (ii) constructing a valid counterfactual − assessing what
would have happened in the absence of the violence.
This paper investigates the mechanisms and costs of disruptions induced by the post-
electoral violence in 2008 on the Kenyan floriculture industry. Export development is im-
portant to promote growth and poverty reduction in low income countries (see, e.g., Rodrik,
2005). The Kenyan floriculture industry provides an important example: one of the largest
earners of foreign currency, the industry is also a major employer of lower educated women
in rural areas. Besides its intrinsic relevance, the setting allows us to overcome the empirical
challenges identified above. Kenyan flowers are produced almost exclusively for the export
market. Since flowers are perishable, daily data on exports, available from trade transaction
records at the firm level before, during, and after the violence, match day-by-day production
activity on the farms. Moreover, flowers are grown and exported by vertically integrated
firms and, therefore, the export data can also be matched with the exact location where
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flowers are produced.1 The ethnic violence that followed the elections in Kenya at the end
of 2007 did not equally affect all regions of the country where flower firms are located. The
detailed information on the time and location of production, therefore, can be combined
with spatial and temporal variation in the incidence of the violence to construct several
appropriate counterfactuals to assess the causal impact of the violence on production. We
also designed and conducted a survey of flower firms in Kenya shortly after the end of the
violence. The survey collected information on how firms were affected by and reacted to
the violence. Once combined with the administrative data, the survey sheds light on the
mechanisms through which the violence affected the firms.
Our core finding is that the electoral violence induced a large, negative, supply shock
in the industry. Controlling for firm-specific seasonality and growth patterns, weekly export
volumes of firms in the affected regions dropped, on average, by 56% relative to what would
have happened had the violence not occurred. With regards to mechanisms, we show two
sets of results. First, we find that workers’ absence, which across firms averaged 50% of
the labor force at the peak of the violence, was an important channel through which the
violence affected production. Second, we explore heterogeneity in both firms’ exposure and
response to the violence. Firms with stable contractual relationships in export markets reg-
istered smaller proportional losses in production and reported proportionally fewer workers
absent during the time of the violence. Rather than being less exposed to the violence,
we argue that these exporters had stronger incentives to maintain production to preserve
valuable reputation in export markets and, accordingly, exerted more effort to retain work-
ers. These results hold even after controlling for characteristics of the labor force (gender,
ethnicity), working arrangements (housing programs on the farm, farm certifications) and
1Other perishable agricultural products, instead, are grown in rural areas and then processed and exported
by firms located in the larger cities of Nairobi and Mombasa. This precludes matching production with
location. For other sectors − most manufacturing − that are not primarily involved in exports, accurate
high-frequency data on production or sales do not exist.
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ownership (foreign, politically connected). After accounting for these characteristics, we find
no evidence that foreign-owned firms, politically connected firms, or certified firms suffered
differential reductions in exports and worker absence.
Given the large negative supply shock, it is important to understand how the demand
side of the market reacted to it. We document that, at the time of the violence, global buyers
sourcing through direct relationships were not able to shift sourcing of flowers to Kenyan
suppliers in unaffected locations nor to suppliers in neighboring Ethiopia. Buyers’ difficulties
in finding alternative sources of supply are consistent with exporters’ efforts to maintain
deliveries. They also suggest that supply-chain risks induced by electoral violence are hard
to insure against. Consistent with this hypothesis, exporters and buyers in direct contractual
relationships mitigated the risk of supply-chain disruptions ahead of the subsequent 2013
presidential election by ramping up shipments just before the election.
This work contributes firm-level evidence on the impact of conflict on trade and firms,
on the mechanisms that underpin its impact, and on the emerging literature on supply-chain
disruptions.2 The literature on the impact of conflict on trade has largely studied disruptions
at a more aggregate level (see, e.g., Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Besley and Persson (2008),
Martin et al. (2008), Glick and Taylor (2010).) More recently, Korovkin and Makarin (2019)
estimates the effects of conflict on trade in non-conflict areas at the micro level using customs
records between Russia and Ukraine. Our paper documents the effect of conflict on directly
affected firms and the underlying mechanisms.
Recent contributions have greatly expanded our understanding of how conflict affects
firms’ performance. Conflict may affect firm performance through supply-side shocks such
as distortions in markets for material and labor inputs (Amodio and Di Maio, 2017; Klapper
et al., 2013; Collier and Duponchel, 2013), unreliable transport, or the fear of theft; demand
2Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) and Dupas and Robinson (2012) provide survey-based evidence of
the violence that followed the Kenyan presidential elections. The large literature on conflict is surveyed in
Blattman and Miguel (2010).
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shocks from negative income effects (Montoya, 2016; Rozo, 2018); or effects at the extensive
margin which influence firms’ entry, exit, and location choices (Blumenstock et al., 2018).
Hjort (2014) also studies the Kenyan flower industry in the aftermath of the 2008 presiden-
tial elections, although he focuses on the operations of an individual flower farm (whereas
we provide sector-wide firm-level evidence), and the effects of conflict on firm performance
through the channel of ethnic divisions within a firm.3 Our paper contributes to the lit-
erature by characterizing both the supply-side and demand-side responses to a short-lived,
but intense, episode of violence. Our evidence also suggests that the business arrangements
developed by firms to participate in global value chains are important in determining the
impact of conflict on trade.4
Finally, the paper contributes to the emerging literature on supply-chain disruptions.
For example, Carvalho et al. (2021) exploit the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 to
quantify the role of input-output linkages as a mechanism for the propagation of shocks.
Barrot and Sauvagnat (2016) also study the extent to which firm-level shocks induced by
natural disasters propagate in production networks and find particularly large effects for
inputs that require specific investments. Blouin and Macchiavello (2019) show that the risk
of delivery failures increases at times of sudden price spikes due to moral hazard. Finally,
Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) study relational contracts between exporters and global
buyers in the Kenyan floriculture industry.5 They exploit the same episode of electoral
3Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) conduct an event study of the sudden end of the civil conflict in Angola,
which was marked by the death of the rebel movement leader in 2002. They find that the stock market
perceived this event as “bad news” for the diamond companies holding concessions there. In contrast to
stock market reactions, our data allow us to unpack the various channels through which the violence has
affected firms’ operations.
4A complementary strand of the literature studies the impact of trade on conflict. For example, Dube and
Vargas (2013) find that an increase in the international price of a labor-intensive (capital intensive) export
commodity reduces (increases) violence in Colombia. Amodio et al. (2017) show that the imposition of
trade restrictions contributes to conflict by inducing a deterioration in manufacturing and local labor market
outcomes. We find suggestive evidence that, at the time of the violence, stable contractual relationships in
export markets might have provided incentives to limit the impact of the violence.
5See also Antić et al. (2021) on contractual relationships and export strategies in the Ethiopian flower
industry.
5
violence to distinguish across competing models of relational contracting. The two papers are
notably different. Unlike this paper, they focus on within-exporters differences in behaviour
across relationships and treat the electoral violence as a reduced form of shock. In contrast,
this paper documents the mechanisms through which the violence was a supply shock and
explores across-firms heterogeneity in the incidence of, and response to, the violence. Using
novel data, this paper also discusses the extent to which global buyers responded by shifting
sourcing across regions in Kenya and, across the border to Ethiopia, and by adjusting ahead
of the subsequent presidential election.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the Kenyan flower industry and the post-electoral violence and describes the
data. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and empirical results. Section 4 discusses
policy implications of our findings and offers concluding remarks. A theoretical framework,
additional empirical results and details about the data are provided in an Appendix.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Kenyan Flower Industry
In the the last two decades Kenya has become one of the leading exporters of flowers in the
world. Between 2005 and 2015 Kenya’s share of the global floriculture increased from 5% to
11% with the country overtaking traditional producers such as Israel and Ecuador. Exports of
cut flowers are among the largest sources of foreign currency for Kenya alongside tourism and
remittances. The Kenyan flower industry counts around 100 established exporters located
in various clusters in the country.
Coordination along the supply chain is critical to ensure the supply of high-quality,
fragile and perishable flowers to distant markets. Flowers are handpicked in the field, kept
6
in cool storage rooms at constant temperature for grading, then packed, transported to the
airport in refrigerated trucks, inspected, and sent to overseas markets. The industry is labor
intensive and employs mostly women in rural areas. The perishable nature of the flowers
implies that post-harvest care is a key determinant of quality. Workers, therefore, receive
significant training in harvesting, handling, grading, and packing, acquiring skills that are
difficult to replace in the short run. Because of both demand (e.g., particular dates such
as Valentines’ Day and Mother’s Day) and supply factors (it is costly to produce flowers
in Europe during winter), floriculture is a business characterized by seasonality. Flowers
are exported from Kenya either through the Dutch auctions located in the Netherlands, or
through direct sales to wholesalers and/or specialist importers. In the first case, the firm
has no control over the price and has no contractual obligations for delivery. In the latter,
instead, the relationship between the exporter and the foreign buyer is governed through a
(non-written) relational contract.
2.2 Electoral Violence
Kenya’s fourth multiparty general elections were held on the December 27, 2007 and involved
two main candidates: the incumbent Mwai Kibaki (a ethnic Kikuyu hailing from the Central
province representing the Party of National Unity (PNU)) and Raila Odinga (a ethnic Luo
from the Nyanza province representing the main opposition party, the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM)). The support bases for the two opposing coalitions were clearly marked
along ethnic lines (see e.g. Gibson and Long, 2009).
Polls leading up to the elections showed that the race would be close. Little violence
occurred on election day, and observers considered the voting process orderly. Exit polls gave
a comfortable lead to the challenger, Odinga, by as much as 50% against 40% for Kibaki.
The challenger led on the first day of counting (December 28) leading to an initial victory
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declaration by ODM (December 29). However, also on the 29th, the head of the Electoral
Commission declared Kibaki the winner, by a margin of 2%. The hasty inauguration of
Kibaki on the afternoon of the December 30, resulted in Odinga accusing the government of
fraud.6 Within minutes of the election results announcement, a political and humanitarian
crisis erupted nationwide. Targeted ethnic violence broke out in various parts of the country,
especially in Nyanza, Mombasa, Nairobi and parts of the Rift Valley, where ODM supporters
targeted Kikuyus who were living outside their traditional settlement areas of the Central
province. This first outburst of violence, which lasted for a few days, was followed by a
second outbreak of violence between January 25−30, 2008. This second phase of violence
happened mainly in the areas of Nakuru, Naivasha, and Limuru as a revenge attack on
members of ethnic groups perceived to be ODM supporters.7 Sporadic violence and chaos
continued until a power-sharing agreement was reached on February 29, 2008 (a calendar of
events is provided in Appendix Figure [B1] which we use as a basis for defining the days of
violence). By the end of the violence some 1,200 people had died in the clashes and at least
500,000 were displaced and living in internally displaced camps.8
2.3 Data
Firm−Level Data. Daily data on exports of flowers are available from trade transaction
records for the period from September 2004 to June 2013. We restrict our sample to estab-
lished exporters that export throughout the majority of the floriculture season. For most
6According to domestic and international observers the vote counting was flawed with severe
discrepancies between the parliamentary and presidential votes (see, e.g., https://www.iri.org/
kenyas-2007-presidental-parliamentary-and-local-elections and https://www.foreign.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/MozerskyTestimony080207a.pdf)
7See, e.g. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008), Independent Review Commission (2008),
and Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (2008).
8The economic effects of the crisis were extensively covered in the international media. See, e.g., The
International Herald Tribune (29/01/2008), Reuters (30/01/2008), China Daily (13/02/2008), MSNBC
(12/02/2008), The Economist (07/02/2008, 04/09/2008), The Business Daily (21/08/2008), and The East
African Standard (14/02/2008).
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of the analysis, we exclude traders as they account for a relatively tiny share of exports
and we lack information on the location of farms where they source flowers. This leaves us
with 118 flower−producing firms. The firms in our sample cover more than 90 percent of all
exports of flowers from Kenya. We complement the Kenyan customs data with records from
neighbouring Ethiopia for the 2007-2010 period.
To complement these records, we designed and conducted a survey of the industry.
The survey was conducted in the summer following the violence through face-to-face inter-
views with the most senior person at the firm, which on most occasions was the owner. A
sample of 75 firms, about three-fifths of established exporters, located in all the producing
regions of the country, was surveyed (additional details on the data collection can be found in
Appendix D). Further administrative information on location and ownership characteristics
was collected for the entire sample of firms (see Table [1]).9
Location and Days of Violence. We classify whether firms are located in areas that were
affected by violence or not.10 The primary source of information used to classify whether a
location suffered from violence or not is the Information Bulletin on the Electoral Violence
(Kenya Red Cross Society, 2008). These bulletins contain daily information on which areas
suffered violence and what form the violence took (deaths, riots, burning of property, etc.).
This information is supplemented by various sources (see Appendix D for details). The first
spike of violence took place from the December 29, 2007 to January 4, 2008 while the second
spike took place from January 25−30, 2008.
9We also gathered qualitative information on firms’ behavior in preparation for the 2013 Kenyan presi-
dential election through phone interviews with a few firms.
10In Appendix Table [C1] lists the flower-growing clusters according to industry reports in which firms are
located. Appendix Figure [B2] shows the nearest towns where these firms are located within Kenya.
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3 Evidence
This section presents the empirical results. Section 3.1 summarizes the key predictions of
the model in Appendix A. Section 3.2 discusses the identification strategy and presents
the reduced form effects of the violence on production. Section 3.3 discusses a variety of
robustness checks and other outcomes. Section 3.4 introduces information from the survey to
disentangle the main channels through which the violence affected the industry and considers
heterogeneous effects for the firms during the violence. Finally, Section 3.5 considers the
extent to which global buyers could react to the violence by shifting sourcing elsewhere
and how the supply chain responded to increased risk ahead of the subsequent presidential
election in 2013.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
The Appendix presents a theoretical framework to understand how firms were affected by,
and reacted to, the violence. The model focuses on the aspects that are most salient to
understand the particular episode we study and is not meant to portray a comprehensive
treatment of how firms might be affected by violence. In particular, we take a short-run
perspective in which a firm’s capital and other input decisions are fixed, we assume an
exogenous price for output not affected by the violence, and abstract from how the violence
might increase uncertainty.
The framework delivers a set of testable predictions on the short-run effects of the
violence on the firms:
1. Export volumes decrease due to the violence. Furthermore: (i) the likelihood of ex-
porting on any given day also decreases because of the violence, but (ii) export volumes
conditional on exporting might either increase or decrease as a consequence of the vio-
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lence depending on the relative importance of the reduction in the number of workers
coming to work versus transportation problems.
2. The reduced form effect of the violence on production is greater for smaller firms and
firms selling mainly through the Dutch auctions.
3. The mechanism works through the reduction in the number of workers coming to
work. Smaller firms and firms selling mainly to the auctions, therefore, lose a higher
proportion of their workers. Furthermore, if the proportion of workers who do not
show up for work is directly controlled for, those firms do not suffer larger reductions
in exports.
The model also offers guidance to calibrate the costs of the violence for the firms
involved, as described below.
3.2 Reduced Form Estimate of the Effect of Violence on Exports
In this section we quantify the effects of the violence on firms’ exports. The location and
timing of the violence was driven by the interaction between political events at the national
and local level and regional ethnic composition (see e.g. Gibson and Long, 2009). Therefore,
the occurrence of violence in any location was not related to the presence of flower firms. In
fact, intense violence was registered in many locations outside of our sample − i.e., in places
without flower firms (e.g., slum areas in Nairobi and other major towns). In the baseline
analysis, we condition on flower firms’ locations and exploit the cross-sectional and temporal
variation in the occurrence of violence between “violence” and “no-violence” regions. In
some locations flower farms are relatively large employers. To eliminate concerns that a
firm’s response and behavior at the time of the crisis affected the intensity and/or duration
of violence in its location, we take an “intention-to-treat” approach in which we classify
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locations as having suffered violence or not during a pre-specified time spell which is kept
constant across locations involved during the same spike (see Appendix D for details on the
exact dates and location of the violence).
Table [1] reports summary statistics for the industry in the two regions. Panel A
reports data from administrative records, while Panel B focuses on information from the
survey. Both panels show that firms in the regions affected by the violence are broadly
similar to firms in regions not affected by the violence. It is important to stress that our
identification strategy does not rely on the two groups of firms being similar along time-
invariant characteristics, since these are always controlled for by firm fixed effects. Finally,
Panel C shows that the sample of surveyed firms is representative of the entire industry.
Firms in the violence region, however, were over-sampled in the survey.
Table [2] investigates the short-run impact of the violence. To do so, it is necessary to
control for season (or growth) and seasonality effects. Let Y (i)LT,W be the exports of flowers
by firm i in location L in period T in winter W. The indicator L takes a value of L = 1 if the
firm is in a location that is affected by the violence after the election and L = 0 otherwise.
The indicator T takes a value of T = 1 during the weeks in January and early February
during which violence occurred and T = 0 during our control period, which are the 10 weeks
before the end of December. Finally, the indicator W takes value equal to W = 1 in the
winter during which the violence occurred − i.e., the winter of 2007/8 and W = 0 for the
previous winter. With this notation, and following our “ITT” approach, a firm was affected
during a particular spike of violence if and only if V = L× T ×W = 1.
Panel A focuses on the first spike of violence, while Panel B focuses on the second
spike. The two panels, therefore, differ in their definition of the violence period T = 1 (but
not of the control period T = 0). The two panels also differ in the division of firms across
locations classified as being affected by the violence, i.e., L. In Panel A there are 20 firms
affected by the violence, while in Panel B, 55 firms are located in regions affected by the
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second spike of violence. In both panels the sample includes 135 firms.
Under the assumption that the change in exports between T = 0 and T = 1 is
constant across winters, it is possible to estimate the effects of the violence on production
for each firm i by looking at the following difference-in-difference:
γ̂L(i) = (Y LT=1,W=1 − Y LT=1,W=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆LT=1(i)
− (Y LT=0,W=1 − Y LT=0,W=0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆LT=0(i)
. (1)
Intuitively, this means, e.g., that the worldwide demand for flowers for the time of
January and February relative to the 10 weeks leading up to Christmas did not change
across the two seasons. The first difference, ∆LT=1(i), compares exports during the time of
the violence with exports at the same time in the previous winter. This simple difference,
however, confounds the effects of the violence with a firm’s growth rate across the two winters,
which is of particular importance in a fast-growing sector. The second difference, ∆LT=0(i),
estimates the firm’s growth rate comparing the non-violence periods − the 10 weeks before
Christmas − in the two winters. Under the assumption that the growth rate between two
successive winters is the same for the weeks before Christmas and in January/February, the
difference-in-difference γ̂L(i) provides an estimate of the effects of the violence which controls
for a firm’s growth rate. Appendix Table [C2] uses data from the two seasons preceding the
violence to provide support for this identifying assumption. The table shows that seasonality
patterns are constant across seasons and similar across regions.11
The bottom rows in Panel A and Panel B of Table [2] report the average γ̂(i) across
firms for the two spikes of violence, with columns (A) and (B) presenting the results for the
no-violence region and the violence regions, respectively. Panel A shows the impact on the
20 firms that were directly affected by the first spike of violence. Rows [3a] and [4] in column
11Later, we provide further support to the identification strategy by reporting parallel trends across regions.
For intuition, the identification strategy is also provided graphically in Appendix Figure [B3].
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(B) show that estimated coefficients for the simple difference and the difference-in-difference
estimates for the effects of the first spike of violence are -1.83 and -1.48 (which translate
roughly to a 56% drop in exports). Panel B shows that the larger group of 55 firms that
were directly affected by the second spike of violence suffered a smaller reduction in exports,
a difference that is not statistically significantly different from zero.
The difference between rows [3a] and [4] in Panel A highlights why accounting for
seasonality is so important: the simple difference overestimates the effect of violence on firms
affected by conflict (as estimated by the difference in difference in row [4]) by -0.34, as it does
not take into account the lower demand for flowers in the first few weeks of the year relative
to the period before the election. This is also a possible explanation for the statistically
significant simple difference within the no-violence region of -0.53 (which is also about -0.34
smaller than the estimated effect of this period in the no-violence region).
Panel B shows diverging experiences in the second spike of the violence. The difference-
in-difference point estimate in the violence region is negative, while it is positive in the towns
not directly involved in the violence. Neither of the two coefficients is statistically significant
at conventional levels. The positive point estimate for no-violence regions could arise if firms
where trying to make up for losses during the first spike or if there were positive spillovers.
Positive spillover could arise, e.g., if buyers who prior to the conflict sourced from violence
areas might try to source from non-violence locations to satisfy their unmet demand and
hence this could cause an increase in exports. Section 3.5 explores this scenario directly but
finds no evidence for it.
Cross-Regional Comparison: Triple Differences. One limitation of the difference-in-
difference estimates is that they do not account for demand shocks that are specific to a date
and winter. This would be the case, for example, if European demand were particularly high
for roses for the 2007/2008 new year. A difference-in-differences approach would conflate
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such demand shocks with the supply shocks induced by the violence. Under the assumption
that any change in the seasonality across winters is the same for the violence and no-violence
areas (which also excludes cross-region spillovers), firms in regions not directly affected by
the violence can also be used as a control group to estimate the direct effects of the violence





L(i) the average of the
difference-in-difference estimates for each firm in location L, a triple difference estimate of
the direct impact of the violence is given by
∆ = ∆
L=1 −∆L=0 (2)
The triple difference estimates are presented in column (C) of row [4] in each of the
two panels. For the first shock of violence, the triple difference is -1.30, roughly in line with
the difference-in-difference estimates. The triple difference estimate for the second spike of
violence is roughly half in size, at -0.61.
Conditional Regressions. Panel A in Table [3] estimates the impact of the violence
on production using daily export data. The estimated regression is given by
yid = αi + µ
m + ηd + λW + θ(W ×T) + γDDD (W ×T× L)id + εid (3)
where yid denotes exports of firm i on a particular date (e.g., January 20, 2008). Location
L ∈ {0, 1} and period T ∈ {0, 1} are defined as above while winter W ∈ {0, 1} is defined
over all available years, i.e., with W = 0 indicating the three winters pre-dating the violence
and W = 1 the winter of 2007/8. Day of the week dummies (i.e., Monday, Tuesday...) are
denoted by m. The specifications control for firm-specific effects αi; day of the year effect
ηd ; winter-specific effect λW (where we allow a different λW for each of the four winters); as
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well as day of the week effect µm. Finally, εid is an error term.
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The indicator functions W, T and L take values equal to one in, respectively, the
winter, period, and location in which the violence took place, and zero otherwise. Let
us define being affected by violence as VWTL = W × T × L, and let VWT = W × T. The
coefficient of interest is γ̂DDD, which provides an estimate of whether, relative to the previous
winters and accounting for seasonality, exports of firms in the violence-affected areas behaved
differently from exports in the no-violence areas during the period of the violence. Columns
in Table [3] include these covariates with progressively less restrictive assumptions.
Column (1) reports the triple difference estimate allowing for different intercepts for
the day of the year, the particular day of the week, and the winter. Column (2) adds
firm fixed effects. Column (3) allows for different winter fixed effects in the violence and
no-violence areas (that is different growth across the violence and the no-violence regions
between successive winters). As mentioned above, the floriculture trade is seasonal and the
seasonality could be different across locations. Column (4) allows flexibility in the seasonal
patterns across regions and is our primary specification. The coefficient of interest γ̂DDD
for both the first and second outbursts of violence are very similar in magnitude to those
estimated in Table [2].
Parallel Trends. The results in column (4) are illustrated by Figure [2]. The figure
plots median residuals of the corresponding baseline regression for firms in the violence and
in the no-violence regions, when the violence terms VWT and VWTL are not included in the
specification. The figure supports the identification strategy: we do not find any evidence of
12With regards to statistical inference, there are two main concerns. First, production and, therefore,
shipments of flowers of a given firm are likely to be correlated within each firm, even conditional on the
fixed effect. If shipment to a particular buyer has occurred today, it is less likely that another shipment to
the same buyer will occur tomorrow. Second, across firms, error terms are likely to be correlated because
firms are geographically clustered and, therefore, shocks to, e.g., roads and transport, are correlated across
neighboring firms. Throughout the analysis using custom records, therefore, standard errors are clustered
both at the firm and the season-week-location level using the Cameron et al. (2011) procedure.
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differences in trends or behavior across regions in the weeks leading up to the violence.
Firm-Specific Growth and Seasonality. Finally, columns (5) and (6) allow for firm-
specific seasonality patterns and firm-specific growth between winters and show that the
estimates of the impact of the violence are robust to allowing flexible growth and seasonality
patterns across firms. Due to the large number of fixed effects being estimated, the statistical
significance is somewhat reduced in column (6).
As noted above, using the no-violence region as a control group could lead to esti-
mates contaminated by spillover effects. Panel B of Table [3], therefore, repeats the same
specifications as in Panel A focusing exclusively on the firms located in the violence regions.
The resulting estimates are very similar to those in Panel A once the extensive set of covari-
ates are used, suggesting that spillovers are of relatively small magnitude. Panel C provides
more direct difference-in-difference evidence on a possible effect of the violence on the control
locations. This first placebo test shows that there is no overall effect on the control areas, at
least not compared with previous seasons and relative to the pre-election period, on average.
3.3 Robustness checks
We conduct additional robustness checks that assess possible alternative explanations of the
observed patterns. Specifically, we (1) investigate the effect of moving away from using
a binary categorization of locations into conflict and no-conflict areas, (2) assess whether
infrequent exporters and traders exported additional flowers during this time, (3) investigate
location-specific growth and seasonality, and (4) conduct a placebo analysis for the period
prior to the conflict.
Violence Intensity and Localization. In Appendix Table [C3], we assess the robustness
of the binary categorization of firms into violence versus no-violence areas by allowing for the
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intensity and the influence area of the conflict to vary. We use the Armed Conflict Location
and Event Data Project (ACLED) as an alternative source of conflict data. This project
geo-codes all instances of political violence and protest around the world and hence also
covers episodes of election violence.
The table provides evidence on the effect of violence at different radii from the flower
firm premises (5 km, 10 km and 20 km) and of the intensity of violence. Columns 1 to 9
show that the effect of violence is very localized. We find a statistically significant effect of
any report of violence (or any report of fatal violence) in a 10 km radius, but not at a 20 km
radius from the flower firms’ premises.
Columns 10 to 12 consider a definition of the violence that takes into account the
number of fatal accidents. We find no statistically significant relationship between the num-
ber of fatalities and the drop in export. We interpret this as evidence that rather than the
violence itself, it is the associated disruptions and workers’ worries due to the fear of violence
and associated insecurity that leads to the drop in production.
Traders and Infrequent Exporters. One potential concern for our empirical strategy,
which relies on using detailed information on established flower exporters to be able to match
export activity to the location of the violence − is that it omits exports of firms who are
not established exporters or for whom we do not have location information that would allow
us to assign them into a violence or no-violence group. This is the case for flower traders,
for which we do not have information on the location of the farms they source flowers from.
Similarly, there are a few infrequent exporters for whom we have export records over the
prior years, and there could have been exports by new entities during this period. Appendix
Figure [B4] shows the total exports of these excluded exporters. Their overall exports are
low, and we do not find any pattern of concern that would suggest that traders may have
exported additional amounts of flowers during this period.
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Placebo and Further Tests. The empirical strategy that underlies much of our analysis
relies on the assumption that there is nothing special about flower supply in the violence
area during the time of the conflict that is not related to the violence. While we cannot
test that assumption directly, we can assess whether exports of firms located in the violence
area appear different just before the election. Appendix Table [C4] shows that there is no
differential pattern in exports in the weeks leading up to the election violence.
To address concerns that there might be location-specific patterns of seasonality and
growth, Appendix Table [C5] shows that the results are robust to accounting for location-
specific seasonality effects. Due to the large number of fixed effects, several of the results are
less precisely measured, but the magnitude is very close to those in our main Table [2].
Effects on Other Firm Outcomes. Appendix Table [C6] presents results for other out-
comes. Column (1) presents the estimate for daily export data and our baseline specification
again as in column (4) of Table [3]. The negative effects on export volumes in a given day can
be decomposed into two effects: a decrease in the likelihood of exporting, i.e., the extensive
margin, (column (2)) and a decrease in the export volumes conditional on exporting, i.e.,
the intensive margins (column (3)).
Results indicate that the second outbreak of violence had a negative and significant
impact on a firm’s ability to export, while the negative point estimate is not significant for the
first period of violence. During both episodes, the export volumes conditional on exporting
decreased as a consequence of the violence, but not significantly so. An extension of the model
delivers ambiguous predictions for the conditional export volumes, since flowers can, though
not ideal, be harvested a day or two earlier or later. Column (4) shows that the unit value in
Kenyan shillings (in logs) increased during both episodes of violence. This result, however,
simply captures the substantial depreciation of the Kenyan currency during the violence.
The Kenyan shilling went from a high of 90 KShs/Euro prior to the presidential elections to
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an exchange rate of 100 KShs/Euro during the first outbreak and depreciated further to 108
KShs/Euro during the second outbreak of violence. Unreported results confirm that unit
values in Euros did not change during the violence. Furthermore, these results confirm that
there was no differential effect on unit values in Kenyan shilling across regions at the time
of the violence.
Column (5) documents that there was no effect of the violence on unit weight either.
In the case of roses, which represent the vast majority of flowers exported from Kenya, a
key determinant of a flower’s value is its size which is, in turn, determined by the altitude
at which the firm is located. Firms are, therefore, relatively specialized in the size of flowers
grown and the evidence confirms that the violence did not affect the composition of exports.
Medium-Run Effects. The violence dummies are defined for the short (i.e., five- to
six-day) periods that correspond precisely to the two spikes of violence. For several rea-
sons, however, it is interesting to consider a longer definition during which violence may
have affected exports. First, sporadic violence occurred throughout the month of February
2008. While not directly affecting firms’ operation, the violence could have created an un-
certain business climate that may have had indirect effects on the industry. Second, (though
none of our respondents mentioned this) firms might have tried to store flowers or intensify
production in the days immediately following the violence in hope of recovering the losses.
Finally, it is interesting to see whether the violence had medium-run effects on the firms (e.g.,
because of damage to a firm’s assets, such as plants, due to workers’ absence). Appendix
Figure [B5] reports the cumulative and the medium run-effects of the violence throughout the
month of February 2008. While the cumulative effect remains negative and shows that firms
never recovered the losses in production incurred during the time of the violence, the figure
also shows that in about one week to 10 days after the end of the second spike, firms were
not suffering any significant medium-run effects of the violence. The relatively short delay
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in recovery is consistent with workers returning to their jobs shortly after the violence ended.
3.4 The Violence as a Supply Shock: Mechanisms
This section investigates the mechanisms through which the violence affected firms. First,
using the survey, we corroborate the violence indicators used in the previous section: firms
in locations classified as having suffered from the violence are more likely to report to have
worker absence, experienced transportation problems and hired security. Second, we explore
heterogeneity in the response to the violence. We then explore the role of workers’ absence
and transportation problems in affecting firms’ performance during the violence. Finally, we
attempt to quantify the short-run losses incurred by firms during the violence.
Incidence of the Violence: Survey Responses. Before turning to the evidence on
production, Appendix Table [C7] shows that survey responses about the violence are very
strongly correlated with the definition of the violence region that we have used in the reduced
form specifications above. In particular, firms located in the violence regions are significantly
more likely to report that their operations have been directly affected by the violence (column
1), there were days in which members of staff did not come to work because of the violence
(column 2), the firm experienced a higher proportion of workers absence due to the violence
(column 3), worker absence caused significant losses in production (column 4), the firm
experienced transportation problems in delivering flowers to the airport (column 5) and the
firm hired extra security personnel during the violence period (column 6).
Heterogeneity in Workers and Export Losses. We now test the model’s predictions
exploring heterogeneity across firms. Table [4] reports cross-sectional correlations between
the firms’ characteristics and the percentage of workers absent at the peak of the crisis for
firms in the violence location. While firms in the violence and no-violence regions appear to
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be broadly comparable along observable characteristics (see Table [1]), the same is not true
across locations within the violence and no-violence regions. Since locations also differ in
the intensity of the violence, the specification includes location dummies as controls.
Table [4], in particular shows a correlation between the marketing channels and (in
most specifications) the size of the firm and the percentage of workers absent during the
violence. In particular, among firms located in the regions affected by the violence, we
find that firms exporting through the auctions and smaller firms report a higher fraction of
workers missing during the violence period. The correlation between marketing channel and
size is robust to the inclusion of a large number of covariates, including (i) location dummies
to account for the intensity of the violence, (ii) dummies for housing, social programs, and
fair-trade-related certifications, (iii) the gender composition of the labor force, (iv) owners’
identity, (v) product variety, and (vi) proxies for capital invested in the firm.
The results could, in principle, be driven by systematic differences in the composition
of the labor force across firms. For example, firms employing a higher percentage of the
minority group in a given locality might suffer higher worker and export losses. In column
(7) we include a measure of the proportion of the workforce that is at risk of violence. We
define being at risk as being a member of an ethnic group that was in the opposite alliance
from the majority ethnic group of the location. While this proportion at risk is positively
correlated with a higher proportion of workers lost, the effect is not precisely estimated.
Table [5] reports the heterogeneity results in exports. We focus on the second outbreak
of violence (as in Panel B of Table [2]) since the small number of firms affected during the
first period of violence (20) precludes the estimation of heterogeneous effects. We include
the firms’ characteristics as in Table [4] interacted with the violence period dummy. For ease
of exposition, the table only reports the coefficients on the interactions between the shock
and the firms’ characteristics of interest.
The evidence supports the predictions of the model with respect to firm size and
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marketing channels: on average, smaller firms and firms exporting through the auctions
suffered a greater reduction in export volumes during the violence.13 The last column in
the table shows that these correlations are robust to controlling for several other firms’
characteristics. Similar to the results in Table [4], we find that the proportion of workers at
risk is not significantly correlated with the size of the effect of the violence.
In sum, the results of the heterogeneity analysis appear to be broadly consistent with
the predictions of the model. The results must, of course, be interpreted cautiously and, in
particular, care should be taken before interpreting the estimates in Tables [4] and Table [5]
as causal effects of firm size or marketing channel on exports and worker retention during the
violence. Unobservable characteristics might correlate with a firm’s exposure, or capacity to
react, to the violence as well as with the firm’s size and marketing channels. The extensive
set of firms’ characteristics we can control for assuages, to some extent, these concerns.
Mechanisms: Worker Absence and Transport. In the firm interviews we asked, on
a week-by-week basis for the period covering January and February 2008, (i) how many
workers were absent, and (ii) whether the firm suffered transportation problems. We now
use these measures to provide suggestive evidence on the relevance of these two mechanisms.
Before describing the results, it is worth pointing out certain limitations of this ex-
ercise. The retrospective nature of the survey might introduce measurement error in the
form of imperfect recall or even bias. For example, respondents may be more likely to recall
worker absence as a problem if they were located in the violence region and have more salient
memories of worrying about worker absenteeism. Furthermore, the extent of measurement
error could be different between reported worker absence and transportation problems.
Although we cannot provide any evidence to assuage such concerns, the interviews
13Although firms that export directly suffer lower reductions in exports than firms exporting through the
auctions, the estimates imply an overall reduction in exports for both types of firms. In a sample of well-
established relationships, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) estimate a 17% drop in exports in the average
relationship. Section 3.5 explores how global buyers in direct relationships react to the shortfall.
23
we conducted in person left us with reassuring impressions. The events we asked about took
place six months before the survey but were still very salient to the respondents. Responses
on transportation difficulties appear to correlate well across respondents within narrowly
defined localities, as expected. With respect to workers’ absence, we asked respondents to
check payroll records.14
A second caveat to this analysis is that both the percentage of workers absent and,
possibly to a lesser extent, transportation problems experienced by the firm are likely to be,
at least in part, the result of an endogenous response by firms to the violence and insecurity.
Notwithstanding these caveats, Appendix Table [C8] reports the results. Specifica-
tions are analogous to those in previous tables, but note that the regressions are estimated
on the sample of interviewed firms only and the unit of observation is at the firm-week level
since the survey variables were asked on weekly basis. Column (1) simply recovers an average
reduced form effect of the violence at the week level. The estimated coefficient is similar
to the estimates obtained in previous specifications. Columns (2) and (3) show that the
time-varying self-reported measures of worker losses and transportation problems correlate
with lower exports. In all cases, estimated coefficients are negative, economically sizeable,
and statistically significant at conventional level.
Column (4) considers the three variables together to quantify the relative importance
of workers’ absence, transportation problems, and the general situation related to the violence
in the location of the firm. All estimated coefficients drop by about half and are no longer
statistically significant at conventional level. The results thus suggest that it is difficult
to statistically attribute the overall effects on exports to specific channels. In the survey,
however, only 50% of firms in the conflict areas report transportation difficulties, while
14We could not access the payroll records directly and, unfortunately, we did not take note during the
interviews about whether the respondent consulted payroll records. Looking at the survey, some respondents
provided precise numbers for workers’ absence while other responses do suggest that the interviewee used
focal categories, suggesting measurement error. Whether the measurement error is exacerbated by recall
bias would be an open question.
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almost 90% report worker absenteeism due to the violence. To gauge the extent to which
worker absence affected exports, column (5) restricts the sample in the violence regions
to those firms that did not experience transportation problems. Interestingly, the point
estimate is indistinguishable from the one estimated using the full survey sample in column
(2). Although the change in sample warrants caution in interpreting the results, the evidence
is consistent with worker losses having been a very important mechanisms through which
the violence affected exports.
Quantifying Losses During the Violence. We now attempt to quantify firms’ losses
during the violence. The model in the Appendix provides guidance on how firm-specific
reduced form estimates of the effects of the violence on production, ∆v, can be combined
with knowledge of the firm’s revenues per worker during normal times, R∗, and estimates of
key underlying parameters to provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the effects of the
violence on firms’ profits.15
Weekly revenues per worker R∗ in normal times are easily computed, for each firm,
by dividing a firm’s export revenues in normal times, proxied by the median weekly revenues
during the 10 weeks control period that preceded the violence (which are available from trade
transaction records), by the number of workers employed by the firm (which is available, for
the same period, from the survey). There are two key parameters to be estimated: the
elasticity of output to the number of workers (η) and the elasticity of workers effort costs to
hour worked (γ). We assume that these are identical across firms. The share of wage costs
in revenues is equal to ψ = 1
1+γ
. Information collected in the survey suggests ψ ' 0.2 for
a typical firm, implying γ ' 4. Note that weekly earnings per worker in normal times are
equal to y∗ = 1
γ+1
R∗. With γ = 4, this gives ŷ∗ ' 1, 250 Kenyan shillings for workers at the
15In the survey we also tried to elicit revenue losses and increases in costs, but the reported figures appear
to be noisy. Besides sources of measurement error described above, a concern is that some respondents might
have inflated losses to influence the business association (with whom we would have shared a report on our
findings) to lobby the government for compensation and additional support.
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median firm (or 14 Euro at pre-violence exchange rates).16
With knowledge of γ, η can be recovered from a regression analogue to the specifica-
tion in Table [4], with the log of the share of retained workers replacing the share of missing
workers. Unreported results reveal an estimated η̂ = 0.56 when γ = 4.
Finally, the reduced form effect of the violence on production ∆v is given by the firm-
level difference-in-difference estimates computed in Table [2], which corresponds to equation
(1). Both the reduced form effect of the violence on production, ∆v, and the revenues per
worker in normal times, R∗, are available for each firm separately, the model can be calibrated
for each firm. By comparing the share of retained workers reported in the survey with the
corresponding estimates from the model calibration, it is possible to further validate the
consistency of the model with the data. Results show a 0.73 correlation between the two
variables, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Results for the median firm (out of the 37 surveyed in the conflict regions with
complete information) are as follows. The drop in production was 56%. Prices in export
markets were not affected by the violence but the Kenyan shilling depreciated by about 10%.
The calibration reveals that labor costs in Kenyan shillings increased by 83% on average but,
given the low share of the wage bill in total costs, this translates into a 19% increase in costs.17
The median firm would thus have made losses during the violence unless operating profit
margins were at least 22%, quite a large number. The estimates thus suggest that the median
firm in the violence region likely operated at a loss during the violence.
16This estimate nicely matches prevailing wage rates in the flower industry at the time of the survey.
These were (about) 200 Kenyan shillings per day immediately before the violence, implying weekly earning
of around 1,200 Kenyan shillings. For this reason, we take γ = 4 as our preferred estimate. Results are
robust using alternative choices of ψ in the range ψ ∈ [0.1, 0.25] .
17The figure includes both the wages paid for the extra hours worked at the farm for the remaining workers
as well as costs incurred to get workers to come to work but does not include other fixed costs (e.g., hiring
of extra security). The interviews, however, revealed that those costs were small.
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3.5 Demand-Side Reaction to the Violence
The violence was thus a large, negative, supply shock to the firms that were affected. Given
this negative supply shock, how did the demand side of the market adjust?
Despite the large shock in Kenya, prices at the auction markets in the Netherlands,
which consolidate demand and supply across the globe, were not hugely affected by the vi-
olence. At the time of the violence Kenya accounted for about 10% of the world’s exports
of flowers. The violence hit half of Kenya’s industry, reducing exports by about 30%. This
implies that the violence caused a relatively small drop in the aggregate supply at the auc-
tions. We thus focus on the response of global buyers sourcing through direct relationships.
These buyers suffered an average reduction in deliveries of about 17% (see Macchiavello and
Morjaria (2015)). We now consider their ability to cope with this shock by shifting sourcing
to other suppliers in Kenya and abroad that were not directly affected by the violence.
Sourcing from No-Conflict Areas in Kenya. For a global buyer regularly sourcing
flowers from firms hit by the violence in Kenya, a first response margin would have been to
try to increase sourcing from Kenyan suppliers not directly affected by the violence. Besides
its intrinsic interest, exploring this channel also allows us to discuss potential spillover across
regions. Table [2] column (1), and Table [3] Panel C document that on average firms in
the conflict areas did not export more flowers relative to prior seasons and prior years. This
suggests that spillovers, if any, do not pose a severe threat to the identification of the reduced
form average treatment effect of the violence. The average finding, however, could be hiding
two opposing effects. First there might be negative spillovers on firms due to a countrywide
effect of the insecurity. Second, there might be a positive spillover if some firms in the
no-conflict area benefited from additional demand for their flowers.
To explore this hypothesis, we focus on buyer-firm relationships in which the global
buyer sourced from firms in both the conflict and no-conflict area. We test for whether
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buyers who were sourcing from exporters located in the conflict area were able to source
additional flowers from firms in the no-conflict area. Table [6] presents the results focusing
on buyer-seller pairs that had relationships before the onset of the violence. Increases along
the intensive margin of trade provides the best path to find evidence of positive spillover
since the data reveal that none of the 64 buyers that exclusively sourced from the conflict
region before the violence was able to start sourcing from the no-conflict region during the
shock. In total, 48 buyers were sourcing in both regions before the violence.
The table explores both specifications with firm and buyer fixed effects (columns (1)
and (3)), as well as specifications in which we condition for buyer-seller pair fixed effects
(columns (2) and (4)). Columns (1) and (2) consider a continuous measure of exposure,
defined as the share of flowers imported from Kenya that the buyer sourced in the conflict
region. Columns (3) and (4) instead consider a simple indicator for whether the buyer
was sourcing any flower at all from the violence region. All specifications include day-of-
year, day-of-week and winter fixed effects. Across the board, we find that buyers that were
sourcing from the conflict region were not able to shift their sourcing to exporters located
in the no-conflict region. Although the estimated coefficient is positive, it is small and far
from being statistically significant in all the specifications.
Sourcing from Ethiopia. Global buyers sourcing in Kenya at the time of the violence
had a second potential margin of adjustment: increase imports from other origins. The
closest substitutes for Kenyan flowers is nearby Ethiopia, a country with a burgeoning flower
export industry of its own and that has consciously supported the development of the sector
through an active industrial policy. Using detailed custom records from Ethiopia, we analyze
whether global buyers that were exposed to the violence in Kenya were able to increase
sourcing from the country. Besides its usefulness for understanding buyers’ response, the
analysis also has potentially important welfare implications. Globally, the negative welfare
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impacts of the violence may well be less if other countries are able to compensate for reduced
Kenyan exports by exporting more.
Table [7] reports the results. Among the 99 global buyers sourcing from Ethiopia
just before the violence, only 16 were also sourcing from Kenya and 9 specifically from the
regions affected by the violence.18 We consider both separately. Note that, consistent with
the evidence from Kenya in Table [6], none of the buyers sourcing flowers in Kenya but not
Ethiopia just before the violence was able to start sourcing in Ethiopia.
The empirical specifications are similar to those in Table [6], and consider both the
continuous and discrete definition of exposure to Kenya in general, and to the regions with
the violence in particular. For simplicity, we focus on specifications that include buyer-seller
pair fixed effects, but results are qualitatively identical when considering the two sets of fixed
effects separately. Across the board, we find that no evidence that global buyers were able
to relocate supplies from Kenya to Ethiopia on short notice.19
Medium-Term Effects of the Violence. In sum, the available evidence suggests that,
to a large extent, global buyers were unable to easily shift sourcing to respond to supply-
chain disruptions caused by the violence. This evidence is consistent with Macchiavello and
Morjaria (2015), which establish that exporters value maintaining a reputation for reliable
deliveries to existing buyers and that it takes time to establish new relationships.
The violence might have had additional medium-term impacts. In the flower industry,
contracts with direct buyers are renegotiated at the end of the summer. Within firms,
relationships that were not prioritized by the firm during the violence are more likely to
break down and not survive to the next season relative to relationships that were prioritized
18These figures suggests that relatively few buyers diversify their sourcing origins in the industry. Similar
patterns are observed in the Ethiopian floriculture industry, see Antić et al. (2021) for additional details on
the Ethiopian context.
19The estimated coefficients using the continuous definition of exposure appear large (although indistin-
guishable from zero) but simply because the average exposure measure is low. They thus imply very small
economic magnitudes.
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by the firm. From the firm perspective, however, the overall impact was modest. This is likely
due to the possibility of selling to the auctions and forming new relationships. In particular,
we check survival rates in the industry one year and two years after the violence. We consider
firms located in the conflict region and those located in the no-conflict region. We further
split the groups between firms that, at the time of the violence, were predominantly selling
through direct relationships versus those that predominantly sold to the auctions. We find
no statistically significant difference in survival rate and export performance across the four
groups two years after the violence.
Mitigating Supply-Chain Risk: Evidence from Kenya’s 2013 Election. The evidence
thus suggests that it is difficult for global buyers to cope with supply-chain disruptions when
they occur. If this is the case, we might expect firms to take precautionary measures when
the risk of supply-chain disruptions increase.
Although the industry fully recovered from the short-lived violence in 2008, the vi-
olence might have cast a long shadow into the future. Specifically, it is possible that the
violence changed firms’ expectations of post-election violence. We analyze whether Kenyan
flower firms (and their buyers) changed the schedule and volume of exports in possible antic-
ipation of violence around the next presidential elections that took place on March 4, 2013.
This would also document whether buyers and firms expected violence or disruptions.
We begin by estimating a countrywide difference-in-differences specification similar
to columns (1) and (2) in Table [2] but for the entire country. We define the potential period
of violence as the period after March 4, 2013. Figure [3] visually suggests that there is a
change in behavior of exporters taking place, and columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table [8] show
that these changes are statistically significant.
We also investigated whether these expectations of violence reacted to the patterns
of violence in 2008 − that is, whether firms located in areas in which there was violence in
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2008 changed their behavior. We do not find any evidence of a location-specific effect. This
may be explained by the fact that the ethnic compositions of the two coalitions changed
across the two elections, so the fault lines would not have been the same as in 2008.
Because firms have a much stronger incentive to maintain relationships we observed
differences in exporting behavior by marketing channel in 2008, we also analyze whether
such differences can be observed in 2013. Panel B of Figure [3] shows the share of a firm’s
exports going to direct buyers versus the auction. We find that firms did prioritize exports
to direct buyers in the days before the election, while there is a visible dip in the share of
exports to firms just after the election.
While this pattern is precisely measured (see columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table [8]),
the overall effect is statistically significant but relatively small. We conducted phone inter-
views with a few exporters before the election to gather qualitative information about their
behavior. The phone interviews suggest that many firms did not perceive the risk of a repeat
of the 2008 post-election violence to be particularly high in 2013. Those who did reported
that flowers are perishable and have a limited shelf life, and thus adjustments in the schedule
of shipments were limited and restricted to buyers with adequate facilities to store flowers.
4 Conclusions
This paper combined detailed administrative records on production, an original firm survey,
and several other data sources, to understand how post-electoral violence in 2008 affected
the Kenyan flower industry.
On the supply side, the results show that the violence induced a large negative shock.
After controlling for firm-specific seasonality patterns and growth, weekly export volumes
of firms in the affected regions dropped, on average, by 56% relative to what would have
happened had the violence not occurred. Large firms and firms with stable contractual
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relationships in export markets registered smaller percentage losses in production. These
firms also reported smaller percentages of workers missing during the time of the violence.
On the demand side, global buyers were not able to compensate the reduction in
deliveries by increasing sourcing from either Kenyan exporters located in areas not directly
affected by the violence nor from neighboring Ethiopian suppliers. Consistent with difficulties
in insuring against supply-chain risk disruptions caused by electoral violence, exporters and
buyers in direct contractual relationships mitigated risk by ramping up shipments just before
the subsequent presidential election.
Taken together, the results have implications for policy makers and business execu-
tives alike. From a policy perspective, the findings from this study are relevant to countries
interested in fostering nontraditional agricultural value chains. For example, the success
of floriculture in Kenya has led several Sub-Saharan countries, most notably Ethiopia, but
also Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Rwanda among others, to promote the development
of the industry. Our results suggest that incentives associated with stable relationships in
nontraditional agriculture encouraged firms to quickly respond to the violence.20 Stable
relationships might be associated with higher exporters’ margins (see Cajal-Grossi et al.
(2019)) but can also lead to foreclosure and less competitive conduct (see, e.g., Boehm and
Sonntag (2020)). While this study does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the social
benefits of such export arrangements, it provides a novel rationale for why policy makers
in countries prone to instability might promote the adoption of such arrangements among
exporters.21 The results also have implications for business executives organizing sourcing
from politically unstable environments. In particular, the same market frictions, such as
20This suggests that the negative effects of the violence might be even larger in traditional agriculture
value chains in which domestic traders and processors market the fresh produce of smaller farmers, often for
the local market.
21From a broader perspective, Hernandez (2015) finds that the growth of the flower sector was associated
with lower rates of unorganized violent crime but no change in guerrilla warfare in Colombia. In the African
context, the development of the flower industry has created job opportunities in rural areas but might have
exacerbated tensions over land and water.
32
search costs and limited contract enforcement, that make stable relationships with suppliers
valuable can also hinder global buyers’ ability to cope with disruptions by swiftly shifting
sourcing to alternative suppliers. Diversifying sourcing origins and planning precautionary
measures when risks of disruptions increase become essential tools of the trade.
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Figures
Figure 1: Elections and Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2018
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Note: The light gray histogram represents the total number of elections across Sub-Saharan Africa in a given year. The
black histogram overlaid on the gray, represents the total number of elections which encountered violence. Calendar year is
represented on the x-axis, and the y-axis shows the number of total and violent elections. The figure highlights the frequency
of elections in Africa that were associated with violent episodes at any time (Panel A) and post-election (Panel B) within the
calendar year corresponding to the election. Data on elections with and without violence were compiled and calculated from
the universe of all country-specific Human Rights Reports published by the U.S. Department of State. A review of available
sources and news articles reveals that of the 14 presidential, parliamentary, or legislative elections held in 2019, 8 saw violence
before, during, or after the vote. Appendix D provides additional details.
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Note: The figure displays the smoothed median biweekly residuals from a regression of export weights (kgs, inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation) on the following fixed effects: firm, day of week, and day of year and winter with violence location, and
presenting residuals separately for the conflict and no-conflict areas (Table [3], column 4). Smoothing is through simple moving



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Firms in Areas with and without Violence, Administrative Records
No violence Violence
Variable Mean SE Mean SE P-value
Export, Jan-Feb 2007 (kg ’000) 11.54 (0.20) 10.95 (0.28) 0.10
Small 0.42 (0.07) 0.47 (0.06) 0.64
Foreign Owner 0.32 (0.06) 0.42 (0.06) 0.22
Indian Owner 0.21 (0.05) 0.21 (0.05) 0.98
Kenyan Owner 0.40 (0.07) 0.30 (0.06) 0.25
Politically Connected Firm 0.28 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04) 0.08*
Exports to Auctions 0.40 (0.07) 0.26 (0.06) 0.10*
Production in Roses 0.56 (0.07) 0.53 (0.06) 0.79
Panel B: Firms in Areas with and without Violence, Survey Data
No violence Violence
Variable Mean SE Mean SE P-value
Number of Workers Jan 2008 521.89 (112.59) 441.13 (45.34) 0.44
Female Workers (%) 61.42 (2.18) 64.39 (2.68) 0.42
Temporary Workers (%) 18.56 (4.98) 23.78 (4.37) 0.45
Workers with Primary Education (%) 90.40 (1.57) 91.21 (1.46) 0.71
Workers Housed 0.48 (0.10) 0.30 (0.07) 0.13
Entry Year 1997 (1.06) 1999 (0.72) 0.03**
Association Member 0.67 (0.09) 0.49 (0.08) 0.15
Certification 0.81 (0.08) 0.69 (0.07) 0.25
Number of Insulated Trucks 1.42 (0.24) 1.05 (0.24) 0.29
Sold to Direct Buyers (%) 50.36 (8.73) 38.54 (6.73) 0.28
Workers at Risk (%) 12.38 (2.73) 32.57 (4.89) 0.00***
Affected Operations 0.37 (0.09) 0.87 (0.05) 0.00***
Experienced Worker Absence 0.23 (0.08) 0.87 (0.05) 0.00***
Workers Lost (%) 4.15 (2.72) 49.33 (5.75) 0.00***
Production Loss because of Worker Absence 0.26 (0.17) 2.35 (0.20) 0.00***
Transportation Problems 0.26 (0.09) 0.64 (0.07) 0.00***
Hire Extra Security 0.08 (0.06) 0.38 (0.08) 0.01***
Panel C: Surveyed vs. Non-Surveyed Firms, Administrative Records
No violence Violence
Variable Mean SE Mean SE P-value
Export, Jan-Feb 2007, in kg ’000 10.82 (0.31) 11.50 (0.21) 0.06*
Violence Region 0.40 (0.07) 0.63 (0.06) 0.01**
Small 0.51 (0.07) 0.40 (0.06) 0.26
Foreign Owner 0.34 (0.07) 0.40 (0.06) 0.52
Indian Owner 0.20 (0.06) 0.22 (0.05) 0.80
Kenyan Owner 0.34 (0.07) 0.36 (0.06) 0.85
Politically Connected Firm 0.20 (0.06) 0.22 (0.05) 0.80
Exports to Auctions 0.38 (0.07) 0.28 (0.06) 0.27
Production in Roses 0.45 (0.07) 0.61 (0.06) 0.08*
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Panel A tests differences in sample-
means for firms in the regions affected by the violence and firms in regions unaffected by the violence using administrative
records only. The sample of firms is the universe of established exporters active in the industry at the time of the violence,
after excluding the four largest firms, traders and infrequent exporters. Exports in the first two months of 2007 (in ’000 kgs),
Production in Roses and Exports to Auctions are computed from custom records. Small, firm ownership (Foreign, Indian
and Kenyan) and Politically Connected Firm are all dummy variables. Panel B tests differences in sample-means for firms in
the locations affected by the violence and firms in locations unaffected by the violence using information collected through a
face-to-face survey designed and conducted by the authors. Workers Housed is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the
firm offers housing for workers at the premises and 0 otherwise. Entry Year is the year in which the firm starts to export
flowers. Association Member is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is a member of the Kenya Flower Council
and 0 otherwise. Certification is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is a participant in any of the standard
certification programs during our study period (Fair-Trade, Max Havelaar Switzerland, Milieu Programma Sierteelt, and Kenya
Flower Council certification). Workers at Risk is percentage of the workforce that is at risk of violence. We define being at risk
as being a member of an ethnic group that was in the opposite alliance from the majority ethnic group of the location from
Population Census data. Affected Operations, Experienced Worker Absence, Transportation Problems and Hire Extra Security
are all dummy variables capturing margins of firm disruptions due to electoral violence. Production Loss because of Worker
Absence is a categorical variable taking values from 0 (not at all) to 4 (severe). Panel C shows that surveyed and non-surveyed
firms do not differ for the administrative data available for both samples. Violence Region is a dummy taking a value of 1 if the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Buyer-Driven Spillovers Across Regions within Kenya
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable Total Daily Exports (kgs, IHS) in Firm-Buyer pair
Days of Violence -0.037 -0.037 -0.012 -0.012
(0.058) (0.043) (0.055) (0.045)
Days of Violence × Proportion Purchased from Violence Location 0.066 0.066
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.174) (0.131)
Days of Violence × Any Purchase from Violence Location -0.012 -0.012
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.081) (0.067)
Fixed Effects
Buyer yes no yes no
Firm - Buyer no yes no yes
Day of year yes yes yes yes
Day of week yes yes yes yes
Winter yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.094 0.305 0.094 0.305
Observations 218,811 218,811 218,811 218,811
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. The dependent variable across all columns
(1 to 4) is total daily exports (kgs, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) in a firm-buyer relationship. Days of violence is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the date in the sample is between and including Dec. 29, 2007 to Jan. 4, 2008 and Jan.
25, 2008 to Jan. 30, 2008; and 0 otherwise. Proportion purchased from violence location in the months preceding violence,
is the proportion of flower purchases the buyer of this exporter-buyer pair (i.e. a direct relationship) made from a violence
location as a proportion of all of the buyer’s purchases in the months prior to the occurrence of violence. Any purchase from
violence location in the months preceding violence, is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if there are any purchases
the buyer in this exporter-buyer pair (i.e. direct relationship) made from any exporter located in a violence location. Violence
location are localities which suffered violence during the first or second outbreaks. Appendix Table [C1] provides further
details on the location of firms in flower clusters (as classified by industry practitioners) and where they are located in terms
of the first or second outbreak of violence. Preceding violence refers to the period Nov. 1, 2007 to Dec. 21, 2007. Sample
period for the analysis is Nov. 3 to Jan. 30 for the years 2004 to 2010, i.e. six winters. Standard errors are obtained by
two-way clustering [see Cameron et al. (2011)] at buyer and season-week level (columns 1 and 3) and buyer-firm relationship
and season-week level (columns 2 and 4) and reported in parentheses.
45
Table 7: Buyer-Driven Spillovers into Ethiopia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Total Daily Exports (kgs, IHS) in Firm-Buyer pair
Days of Violence -0.080 -0.082 -0.082 -0.082 -0.082
(0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Days of Violence × Proportion Purchased from Violence Location -0.684
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.593)
Days of Violence × Any Flowers Purchased from Violence Location -0.397*
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.212)
Days of Violence × Proportion Purchased from Kenya 0.386
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.379)
Days of Violence × Any Flowers Purchased from Kenya 0.084
in the Months Preceding Violence (0.253)
Fixed Effects
Firm yes - - - -
Firm - Buyer - yes yes yes yes
Day of year yes yes yes yes yes
Day of week yes yes yes yes yes
Winter yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.199 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360
Observations 90,478 83,997 83,997 83,997 83,997
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. The dependent variable across all columns
(1 to 4) is total daily exports (kgs, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) in a firm-buyer relationship. Days of violence is
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the date in the sample is between and including Dec. 29, 2007 to Jan. 4, 2008 and Jan.
25, 2008 to Jan. 30, 2008. Proportion purchased from violence location in the months preceding violence, is the proportion
of flower purchases the buyer of this exporter-buyer pair (i.e. a direct relationship) made from a violence location in Kenya
as a proportion of the buyer’s purchases from either Kenya or Ethiopia in the months prior to the occurrence of violence.
Any purchase from violence location in the months preceding violence, is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if this
proportion is bigger than zero. The two variables Proportion purchased from Kenya and Any flowers purchased from Kenya
are defined in the same manner, except with reference to exports from Kenya as a whole. Violence location are localities which
suffered violence during the first and second outbreaks. Appendix Table [C1] provides further details on the location of firms
in flower clusters (as classified by industry practitioners) and where they are located in terms of the first or second outbreak
of violence. Preceding violence refers to Nov. 1, 2007 to Dec. 21, 2007. Sample period for the analysis is Nov. 1 to Mar. 9
for the years 2007 to 2010, i.e. three winters, so that seasonality patterns are estimated with post-violence data. Standard
errors obtained through clustering at firm-level (column 1) and firm-buyer relationship level (columns 2-5) and reported in
parentheses.
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Table 8: Anticipation Effects in the 2013 Election




















Days before the 2013 election 0.168** 0.032*** 0.319*** 0.015*
(0.070) (0.010) (0.072) (0.009)
Days after the 2013 election -0.208*** -0.027** -0.307*** -0.015*
(0.074) (0.010) (0.069) (0.009)
Fixed Effects
Firm yes yes yes yes yes yes
Day of year yes yes yes yes yes yes
Day of week yes yes yes yes yes yes
Winter yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.604 0.777 0.634 0.772 0.616 0.770
Observations 46,314 18,237 66,732 26,478 113,046 44,715
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. The dependent variable in columns 1, 3
and 5 is daily exports (kgs, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) and in columns 2, 4 and 6 is the share of exports to direct
buyers, defined as total non-auction exports as a proportion of exports to the auction or direct buyers. The 2013 election took
place on Mar. 4, 2013. Days before the 2013 election is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the date falls between Feb. 24
and Mar. 4, 2013 and 0 otherwise. Days after the 2013 election is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the date is including
and after Mar. 4 and before Mar. 11, 2013 and 0 otherwise. Sample period in column 1 and 2 are the following periods: Jan.
1−Mar. 3 2011, Jan 1−Mar. 2, 2012 and Jan. 1−Mar. 3, 2013; in column 3 and 4 are the following periods: Mar. 4−May
31, 2011; March 3−May 31, 2012 and Mar. 4−May 31, 2013 and columns 5 and 6 are the days from Jan. 1−May 31 in the
years 2011 to 2013. Number of observations reduce from the odd numbered columns to the even numbered columns because
the odd numbered columns include zero exports to both auction and non-auction, whereas the even columns are conditional on
exporting (since the share to buyers is not defined when no exports were done). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level




Electoral Violence and Supply Chain Disruptions in
Kenya’s Floriculture Industry




This section presents a theoretical framework to understand how firms were affected by, and
reacted to, the violence. The model focuses on the aspects that are most salient to understand
the particular episode we study and is not meant to portray a comprehensive treatment of
how firms might be affected by violence. In particular, we take a short-run perspective in
which a firm’s capital and other input decisions are fixed, we assume an exogenous price
for output not affected by the violence, and abstract from how the violence might increase
uncertainty. The model derives predictions which are tested in the main empirical section.
A.1 Setup










where, with some abuse of notation, N is the set as well as the measure of hired workers,
i.e., i ∈ N ; li is the hours worked by each worker i; and θ is a firm-specific parameter. The
production function allows for productivity gains due to specialization through the term Nβ,
with β ≥ 0. Note that we abstract from other inputs, such as materials and capital, since
those are fixed over the short-run period during which the violence occurred.




, where yi denotes her income
and γ > 0. Each worker has a reservation utility u. The firm sells flowers in a foreign market
taking the world price p as given.
In practice, firms in the flower industry hire and train workers at the beginning of
the season − September to October. Since we are interested in studying a short episode of
ethnic violence which happened in the middle of the season, we take the pool of hired and
trained workers N as given and focus for now on the firm’s choice of hours worked li, which
can be adjusted throughout the season.22 When studying the firm’s reaction to the ethnic
violence, we will allow the firm to partially adjust the labor force as well.













22It is straightforward to relax this assumption, and show that the optimal N is an increasing function of
θ. Considering this would not alter the predictions obtained below.
A.2
The firm offers a contract to each worker which specifies the amount of hours to be
worked, li, and a wage per hour, wi. We assume a large pool of identical workers from which
the firm can hire and, therefore, each contract offered by the firm satisfies the worker’s
participation constraint with equality. Since a worker’s income is equal to yi = wili, the
binding participation constraint implies wili =
l1+γi
1+γ
+ u. It is easy to check that the profit
function of the firm is concave and symmetric in li and, therefore, the optimal solution entails
li = lj, ∀i, j ∈ N . For convenience, we set u = 0 and denote η = β + α, with η ∈ ( 11+γ , 1).
23
The profit function can then be rewritten as




The firm chooses the optimal l taking as given N, θ, and p. The following statement charac-
terizes a firm production, wages and profits in normal times.
Observation: Denote by R∗ = (pθNη−1)
1+ 1
γ the revenues per worker in normal
times. Then, total production is q∗ = R
∗
p
N, profits are Π∗ = γ
γ+1




A.2 Ethnic Violence: Workers’ Absence
The main channels through which firms were differentially affected across regions by the
violence have been (i) the absence of workers, and (ii) transportation problems.24 In our
context, it might take up to 400 workers to pluck, cut, arrange, and pack an amount of
flowers that fills up one single truck. Once the truck is ready to take the flowers to the
airport, it only takes one driver and, during the violence, a security guard to operate it. The
interviews in the field reveal that firms paid fixed costs (e.g., hired security) to ensure they
could safely deliver flowers to the airport. Generally speaking, however, respondents report
23The production function thus allows for imperfect substitution across workers who might be involved
in different tasks (α < 1) and for gains from specialization (β ≥ 0). Provided overall returns to scale
guarantee the second order conditions are satisfied, the model can accommodate the special case with perfect
substitution, and no gains from specialization.
24The sudden electoral violence would also lead to more uncertainty in the business climate. Since our
survey was retrospective we lack detailed information on the firms’ perceptions of risk during the events and
we thus abstract from this channel. In the empirical section, however, we also explore firms’ behavior ahead
of the subsequent presidential election in 2013, a time in which the risk of supply-chain disruptions increased
and firms adopted precautionary measures in response.
A.3
that increases in transport costs were small and not a major impediment to exporting.25 For
these reasons, this section focuses on the worker absence channel. An extension of the model
that deals with transportation problems is further explored below.
In line with interviews conducted in the field, we assume that the shock was com-
pletely unanticipated by firms. Since violence was not targeted towards firms but rather
individuals in the general population, we model the violence as an exogenous shock to the
reservation utility of workers. In particular, assume that worker i faces a cost ci ≥ 0 of
coming to work during the period of violence. The costs ci are independently drawn from
a distribution with continuous and differentiable cumulative function F (c,C), where C pa-
rameterizes the intensity of the violence at the firm’s location. The cost ci captures, in a
parsimonious way, various reasons why many workers found it harder to go to work − e.g., (i)
psychological and expected physical costs due to the fear of violence during the commuting
and/or on the farm, (ii) the opportunity cost of leaving family and properties unguarded
while at work, and (iii) the opportunity cost of fleeing to the region of origin for security
reasons or to be closer to family members that were experiencing violence.
Given cost ci, a worker offered a wage w
v
i to work for l
v








where the superscript v makes explicit that the firm re-optimizes the wage policy at the time
of the violence and might choose to compensate workers for the costs of coming to work.
In adjusting the labor force to the new circumstances, the firm keeps the “cheapest”
workers − i.e., an interval of workers that have low realizations of the shock ci. Furthermore,
due to the symmetry of the production function, it is optimal for all workers kept at the
farm to work lv hours. The optimal policy for the firm, therefore, consists of choosing (i) the
threshold cv such that workers with ci ≤ cv come to the farm, and (ii) the hours worked by
each worker, lv. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that the firm can offer different
25Firms also coordinated convoys to increase security and, indeed, ensuring that trucks could go to the
airport was one of the government priorities during the violence. Media reported that the police dislodged
roadblocks along the main routes from the flower farms to the airport.
A.4
wage contracts wvi to each worker i.
26 The problem of the firm can then be rewritten as
max
c,l







Assuming an interior solution in which the share of workers that come to work during the
violence is σv = F (c





∗ and cv = η (R∗)
γ
1+γ (σv)




The two first order conditions deliver several implications.27 First, by increasing the
cost of coming to work for the worker, the impact of violence on production is negative. This

















η(1 + γ)− 1
γ
ln (σv) . (10)
The effect of the violence on production can be decomposed into two effects: the negative
effect coming from a reduction in the number of workers coming to work, η lnσv < 0, is






Second, the model provides guidance on how to quantify the impact of the violence
on firm profits. Defining µ = η(1+γ)−1
1+γ
and substituting ∆v and lv in the first order condition
for cv, we obtain, after some manipulation,








26None of the qualitative results are affected by allowing the firm to offer worker specific wages wvi . In
practice, firms arranged transportation and accommodation for the workers that had problems coming to the
farm. Some part of the costs, therefore, have been worker specific. If, however, firms had to pay a common
wage, infra-marginal workers would earn rents. This does not mean they benefited from the violence since,
presumably, overall utility would be lower through other channels. As we have no data on individual workers,
we refrain from exploring how the violence affected them.












> 0. It is straightforward to check that ∂
2Πv
∂l2 < 0 holds. The remaining conditions hold, e.g., when
F (·) is either uniform or exponential for reasonable parameterizations of the production function.
28Since the share of workers coming to work during the violence is endogenously chosen by the firm, a




The estimated effect of the violence on production, ∆v, therefore, can be combined with
information on revenues per worker during normal times, R∗, to recover a bound to the
extra costs incurred by the firm at the time of the violence.29
A.3 Heterogeneity in the Reduced Form Effects
This section discusses two comparative statics suggesting heterogeneous reduced form effects
of the violence on production, ∆v, depending on firm’s size and marketing channel.
Size Effects: Consider first a proxy for the size of the firm, given by the quantity







Straightforward implicit differentiation of equation (12) gives ∂c
v
∂q∗
> 0 and, by equation (10),
∂∆v
∂q∗
> 0.30 This means that the effect of the violence on production and worker loss is greater
for smaller firms.
Marketing Channels: Some firms in the industry export flowers through direct relationships
with foreign buyers. In such case, the firm receives a unit price pd which is agreed upon at the
beginning of the season for delivering a prespecified quantity q∗. In these relationships, firms
might suffer a penalty for failing to deliver the agreed quantity. We are not interested in
explicitly deriving the penalty schedule. We think of the penalty as arising from reputation
losses, rather than stemming from an enforceable clause stipulated in a contract. Macchi-
avello and Morjaria (2015) document that these relationships are typically not governed by
written contracts. In the unlikely event parties had stipulated a contract with enforceable
penalties, the foreign buyers would likely have suspended any penalties for failing to deliver
the contracted quantities during this period (e.g., most contracts allow for exceptions due
to acts of God). Indeed, Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015) find evidence that exporters
29In order to recover cv, knowledge of the parameters γ and η is required. Note, however, that the share
of the wage bill in revenues, which can be obtained from the survey, is equal to 11+γ , and that, for a given
γ, an estimate of η can be recovered from the relationship between the effects of the violence on production,
∆v, and the share of workers coming at the firm, σv, as suggested by equation (10).
30While implicit differentiation of equation (12) implies ∂∆
v
∂N < 0, if N was endogenously chosen by the
firm, the model would predict a positive correlation between ∆v and N. Since export data are available for
all firms in the sample while labor force is available only for surveyed firms, it is convenient to measure size
in terms of export volumes and avoid the unnecessary complication of endogenizing N in the model.
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strategically responded to the violence to maintain a reputation for being a reliable supplier
with their main customers.
For simplicity, we assume that if the firm delivers a quantity q < q∗ to the buyer, the
firm incurs a reputation loss worth Ω(q∗ − q) > 0. The reputation loss is zero otherwise.31
The firm can always sell flowers to the spot market at a price p. Therefore, a necessary






if q < q∗.32 Inspection of equation (12) when p is replaced by pd− ∂Ω∂q shows that, in responding
to the violence, a firm engaged in a contract with a direct buyer has stronger incentives to
retain workers and keep producing relative to a firm which takes prices as given on the spot
market. The model thus suggests that, during the violence, firms that sell through direct
relationships might end up being worse off than firms that sell at exogenous prices to the
international market as they incur additional costs to avoid the penalty.33
A.4 An Extension: Transportation Problems
We now turn to the second mechanism through which the ethnic violence has affected firms’
operation: transportation problems. The model is modified as follows. In order to export
in any given day, firms face a fixed cost of transportation T.34 Firms can, however, store
flowers for some days. If a flower is stored for d days, it reaches the final market in good
condition with probability δd/2. Given the data in our sample, we focus on the case in which
firms must ship at least once a week − i.e., after D = 6 days, flowers are worthless.
In normal times, the firm chooses the optimal frequency of shipment, and then adjusts
its labor inputs accordingly. The firm’s profits when harvesting flowers that are sent after d
day, are δdΠ∗, where Π∗, derived in the main text, now incorporates the transportation costs
31One could imagine that the violence provides an opportunity for firms to prove their worth. What
matters for incentives, however, is the slope, rather than the level, of the payoffs function.
32Note that ∂Ω∂q < 0 allows for pd < p. If this condition was violated at q
∗, the firm would prefer to reduce
the shipment to the buyer and obtain higher prices on the spot market.
33These firms also suffer lower revenue losses, but in the absence of the penalty they would have (optimally)
chosen a lower production.
34The focus on fixed costs, as opposed to variable costs, deserves some justification. The major component
of variable transportation costs for the firm are the freight charges. These were not affected by the ethnic
violence and, therefore, can be absorbed in the price p. Fixed costs in transportation arise, instead, to send
one truck to the airport.
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Td. It is straightforward to show the following:
Lemma
During normal times, the firm ships every day of the week if 1−δ
T
Π∗ ≥ 1. The firm






. Otherwise the firm ships
once per week.
Conditional on the number of shipments, the firm tends to equalize the amount of
flowers exported in every shipment. For this reason, the firm either exports every day of
the week, or four times or less per week. On any particular day d, the quantity therefore
exported by the firm can be decomposed as
qd = Id︸︷︷︸
prob. of exporting
× ΣD∗i=0δiq∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
q | on exports
,
where Id = 1 is an indicator of whether the firm exports in day d and D
∗ is the number of
days since the previous shipment.
We model the violence as having increased T for a few days. In response, firms re-
adjust i) their export frequency and ii) the quantity exported. The effect of the violence
on the likelihood of exporting on any given day is negative, since 1−δ
T
Π∗ decreases. This
implies that, on average, Dv > D∗. The quantity of flowers exported in each shipment,
however, might either increase or decrease. The quantity of flowers exported in each shipment
decreases if firms do not reduce their export frequency i.e., if Dv = D∗. For these firms, the
only effect is qv < q∗. For firms for which Dv > D∗, however, the quantity of flowers exported
in each shipment might increase, since ΣD
v
i=0δ
iqv ≤ ΣD∗i=0δiq∗. For firms that do not suffer from
workers’ absence, transportation problems cause (i) a decrease in the likelihood of exporting,
and (ii) conditional on exporting, an increase in the export volumes.
A.5 Summary of Predictions
The framework delivers a set of testable predictions on the short-run effects of the violence on
the firms which we bring to the data in the main paper. To summarize, the model suggests:
1. Export volumes decrease due to the violence. Furthermore: (i) the likelihood of ex-
porting on any given day also decreases because of the violence, but (ii) export volumes
A.8
conditional on exporting might either increase or decrease as a consequence of the vio-
lence depending on the relative importance of the reduction in the number of workers
coming to work versus transportation problems.
2. The reduced form effect of the violence on production is greater for smaller firms and
firms selling mainly to the auctions.
3. The mechanism works through the reduction in the number of workers coming to
work. Smaller firms and firms selling mainly to the auctions, therefore, lose a higher
proportion of their workers. Furthermore, if the proportion of workers who do not
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Figure B1: Timeline of Events
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Note: The figure illustrates the timeline of events leading to the two outbreaks of violence in the aftermath of the fourth
multi-party general elections in Kenya held on December 27, 2007. The challenger (Odinga, ODM party) led on the first day
of counting (December 28, 2007) leading them to declare a initial victory (December 29, 2007). However on December 29,
2007 the head of the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki the winner, by a margin of 2%. The hasty inauguration
of Kibaki on the afternoon of December 30, 2007 resulted in Odinga accusing the government of fraud. Within minutes of
the announcements of the election results, a political and humanitarian crisis erupted nationwide. Targeted ethnic violence
broke out in various parts of the country where ODM supporters, targeted Kikuyus who were living outside their traditional
settlement areas of the Central province. This first outbreak of violence, which lasted for a few days, was followed by a second
outbreak of violence between January 25 and January 30, 2008 when mediation efforts failed. This second phase of violence
happened mainly in the areas of Nakuru, Naivasha and Limuru as a revenge attack on members of ethnic groups perceived




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B3: Illustration of Identification Strategy
Nov 4, 2007 Dec 22, 2007 Dec 29, 2007 Jan 4, 2008
Nov 4, 2006 Dec 22, 2006 Dec 29, 2006 Jan 4, 2007
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OutlineIntroduction Background Evidence ConclusionIdentification Strategy: DDD
Note: In order to estimate the impact of the violence on exports, it is necessary to control for both growth across years and
the fact that exports within any year follow a seasonal pattern. Our main dependent variable is daily exports (Y (i)LT,W ), i.e.
exports of flowers by firm i located in location L in period T in winter W. The indicator L takes a value of L = 1 if the firm
is in a location that is affected by the violence after the election and L = 0 otherwise. The indicator T takes a value of T = 1
during the weeks in January 2008 and early February 2008 during which violence occurred and T = 0 during our control period,
which are the 10 weeks before the end of December. Finally, the indicator W takes value equal to W = 1 in the winter during
which the violence occurred - that is the winter of 2007/8 - and W = 0 for the previous winter. With this notation, a firm was
directly affected during a particular spike of violence if and only if V = L× T ×W = 1.
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Days since start of Violence
Time of Violence Exports
Note: The figure reports the residuals from a regression of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the two-day moving
average of exports (kgs) on day of year, day of week and season fixed effects. The exports are aggregated across traders (who
do not know own flower farms but instead procure and export flowers) and infrequent exporters defined as all exporters who
are not traders or the regular exporters analyzed in Table [2] and Table [3] around the period of the electoral violence. A
two-day moving average is reported as it retains the higher variability during the violence period relative to the period before
the violence while providing minimal smoothing of the daily data.
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Days since end of Second Outbreak of Violence
Cumulative Estimate Estimate
Note: The figure displays the estimated coefficients of the differential cumulative and medium-run effects of the violence following
the second outbreak of violence (from Jan. 30, 2008 onwards) on daily exports (kgs, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation)
using the baseline specification in column (4) of Table [3]. The estimate peaks around 14 days after the end of the second
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Athi River 10 0 0
Kiambu 18 0 1
Mt Elgon 6 1 0
Mt Kenya 13 0 0
Nairobi 5 0 0
Naivasha 38 0 1
Nakuru 20 1 1
Thika 25 0 0
Panel B
First Outbreak of Violence [29 Dec 2007 - 4 Jan 2008]
Winter No. Firms Violence No-violence
1 99 16 83
2 111 17 94
3 118 19 99
4 135 20 115
Second Outbreak of Violence [25 Jan 2008 - 30 Jan 2008]
Winter No. Firms Violence No-violence
1 99 39 60
2 111 46 65
3 118 47 71
4 135 55 80
Note: This table provides details of the location of flower firms in violence and non-violence localities (Panel A). Flower clusters
are designated by industry practitioners and are geographically dispersed across various provinces. The total number of firms
is 135, by provinces they are located as follows: 53 firms in Central, 18 in Eastern, 5 in Nairobi, and 60 in Rift Valley. Winter
= 4 refers to the 2007/08 period, Winter = 3 refers to the 2006/07 period, Winter = 2 refers to the 2005/06 period and Winter
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C8: Worker and Transportation Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Daily Exports (kgs, IHS)
Week of Violence × Violence location -0.637* -0.296
(0.355) (0.327)
Workers Absent (% ) -1.103** -0.456 -1.271**
(0.541) (0.514) (0.602)
Transportation Problems suffered by firm -0.705** -0.418
(0.340) (0.321)
Fixed Effects
Firm × Winter yes yes yes yes yes
Firm × Week yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 24,030 24,030 24,030 24,030 12,638
R-squared 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.474
Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. The dependent variable across all
columns (1 to 5) is daily exports (kgs, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation). Sample period for the data set is four winters
(2004 to 2008) over the period Nov. 3, 2004 to Jan. 30, 2008 for the 73 firms surveyed. Week of violence is a dummy variable
taking a value of 1 if the date falls within the first (Dec. 29, 2007 to Jan. 4, 2008) or second outbreak of violence (Jan. 19, 2008
to Jan. 30, 2008. Workers Absent (%) is the highest percentage of workers absent reported by the firm throughout the violence
period, i.e., during the first six weeks of 2008. Violence location is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm locality suffers
from violence and 0 otherwise. Transportation Problems suffered by firm is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm
responded of suffering transportation problems. Column (5) is a reduced sample as the analysis is only on firms that reported
transportation problems (37 firms). Standard errors are obtained by two-way clustering at firm and winter-week-location level
[see Cameron et al. (2011)] and reported in parentheses.
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D Data Sources and Construction
This appendix section provides information supplementary to Section 2 on the various data
sources used in the paper.
Transaction-level Export Data of Flower Firms in Kenya
Custom records on exports of flowers were obtained from the Kenya Horticultural Devel-
opment Authority (HCDA) for the seasons 2004-2013. Each transaction invoice contains
the following information: name of exporter, name of the foreign consignee/client, type of
produce, weight (kgs), units, unit value, total value, date, destination, currency and the
agreement on freight (C&F, FOB).
Transaction-level Export Data of Flower Firms for Ethiopia
Customs records on exports of flowers were obtained from the Ethiopian Horticultural De-
velopment Agency (EHDA) for the seasons 2007-2010. Each transaction invoice contains
the following information: name of exporter, name of the foreign consignee/client, type of
produce, weight (kgs), units, unit value, total value, date, destination, currency and the
agreement on freight (C&F, FOB). For additional details on the Ethiopian context and data
see Antić et al. (2021).
Firm-level Survey
A firm survey was designed by the authors which covered (i) general questions about the firm
(history, farm certification, ownership structure, vertical integration, location of farms, etc.),
(ii) contractual relationships in export markets and marketing channels (direct wholesaler
and/or auction houses), (iii) firm production (covering detailed information on labor force,
input use, and assets), (iv) operations during violence period (effect on operations, absence
of workers by week, issues on transportation and air-freight, financial losses and extra-costs
incurred). The survey was administrated and implemented by two of the authors between
July and September 2008.
The sampling frame was constructed combining multiple sources of information: the
list of exporters in the customs records, and the members of relevant firms’ associations
(Kenya Flower Council [KFC], Fresh Produce Exporters Association of Kenya [FPEAK],
and Kenya Private Sector Alliance [KEPSA]. The membership lists of the flower associa-
tions included contact information for the firms, although the list from FPEAK had several
instances of contacts that were out-of-date and were generally of lower quality than the KFC
list. Customs records do not include contact details for the firms. We thus complemented the
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search of contacts for firms through a variety of other sources, including internet searches,
snowball interviews and our extensive time in the field.
We attempted to contact and survey all the firms for which we obtained contact
details. The first contact was done by the authors over the phone. We would then set up an
appointment for a face-to-face interview. Firms’ responses to this type of contact request is
often low. Initially, this was not different in our case. After initial setbacks, we were able
to interview a firm whose owner was a active member of the KFC. The respondent took
interest in the project and then facilitated access to other members of KFC, our presence
on the ground further enabled access. Finally, for firms we still could not reach over the
phone to set up appointments, we contacted firms directly through in-person visits at the
premises of their flower farms. This last effort was mostly targeted towards firms in the
conflict location.
Overall, our response rates are high for this type of firm survey. We were able to
interview 75 firms out of 122 (61%) for which we had confirmed a location for the farm.35
Administrative-level Data
We established contacts with the HCDA, KFC and KEPSA to assist us in obtaining the
location of all firms in the sample. Further, the names of the directors of the firms were
obtained from the Registrar of Companies at the Attorney General’s Office. These pieces of
information allow us to classify the owner’s nationality (Kenyan indigenous, Kenyan Indian
or Foreign). For the firms which are under the ownership of Kenyan indigenous persons and
Kenyan Indians, we map out whether the owners are politically connected or not. The data
are assembled from the biographies of Member of Parliament’s, further snowballing from
interviews in the field, and various sources from the internet (e.g., The Kroll Investigative
Report). Given the small number of firms, it is widely known in the industry which firms
are politically connected. Information for each firm is cross-checked and triangulated using
at least three different sources.
Days of Violence and Conflict Location
Locations are classified as having suffered conflict or not based on reports from Kenya’s Red
Cross Society (KRCS). The KRCS issued Information Bulletin on the Electoral Violence in
35In subsequent work in preparation for the 2013 election, as we attempted to identify locations of new
firms via Google Maps and reports produced in the interim by the industry. We were also able to identify
locations of firms (often smaller firms that were not part of the established grower associations) that we had
not been able to find physical locations for in the 2008 data effort. These firms are part of the estimation
sample we use to investigate exports Table [3].
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the early stages of the crisis daily and later on twice or so a week till the end of the crisis
(see Kenya Red Cross Society (2008) for additional details). The first information bulletin
(No. 1 of January 3, 2008) also contained a map which outlined locations where unrest had
occurred. We further obtain access to various sources to supplement our understanding on
both whether the location suffered conflict and when this took place. These are:
1. Disaster Desk of the Data Exchange Platform for the Horn of Africa (DEPHA): during
the post-election violence DEPHA provided maps with hot spots on where and when
the violence had occurred. DEPHA’s mandate is to provide geographic information
data and services to the region under the UN’s OCHA. We obtained all the DEPHA
maps from: http://www.depha.org, accessed on September 23, 2008.
2. Open source project Ushahidi was also launched to gather information from the general
public on events occurring in near-real time. The public could pin on a online map
of Kenya when and where conflict had erupted. Details on Ushahidi : http://www.
ushahidi.com/about, and the Kenya project: http://legacy.ushahidi.com/ can
be found on these links (accessed on September 30, 2008).
3. Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Report (2008).
4. Independent Review Commission Report (2008), initiated by the Government of Kenya
to set up a commission into post-election violence.
These sources are useful additional sources of information to make sure we are exhaustive
and that smaller towns are not missed out. We use these reports to aid our understanding
but are aware that there could be an inherent measurement error due to their objective.
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
We obtain data from ACLED for Kenya to supplement our measure of both location and
days of violence.36 ACLED provide GPS coordinates for where violence occurred, and how
many (if any) fatalities resulted from the violence. Based on these data, and the location
of the flower firms (details below), we construct four measures of proximity and intensity of
violence used in Appendix Table [C3], for three concentric circles around the firms of radius
5 km, 10 km, and 20 km:
36ACLED Version 4 (1997-2013): http://www.acleddata.com/data/version-4-data-1997-2013/, ac-
cessed April 2014.
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1. Was there any episode of violence in the election time within a radius of 5 km, 10 km,
and 20 km around the firms’ location?
2. Was there any episode of violence within a radius of 5 km, 10 km, and 20 km around
the firms’ location?
3. Was there any episode of violence in which at least one fatality was recorded within a
radius of 5 km, 10 km, and 20 km around the firms’ location?
4. What was the number of fatalities recorded within a radius of 5 km, 10 km, and 20
km around the firms’ location?
Flower Farm Location
In our initial firm survey in 2007 we were unable to include a GPS module; however, in
2014 we used two sources to help us identify the GPS coordinates of flower firms. The first
source we used was Google satellite imagery to geo-tag flower firms. For flower farms that
were not easily identifiable on Google Maps, we used a second source, maps of flower farm
locations from industry reports. Maps from industry reports showed a selection of flower
firms in growing clusters. These maps do not provide any coordinate system nor any scale.
We try to geo-reference the maps by using other location information on the maps, such as
important main roads and natural features (e.g., mountains, lakes, rivers, and forests). In
instances where we failed to accurately pinpoint the location, coordinates were then taken
from a point that is relatively close to the main road and the farm’s staging area.
Kenya Ethnic Census
We use the population census of 1989 (Government of Kenya, 1994) to obtain district eth-
nic demographics. The 1989 National Population Census was the last Kenyan census that
publicly released sub-national ethnic population. The population census reports 41 ethnic
classifications. In line with studies on the politics of Kenya (e.g., Burgess et al. (2015) and
Morjaria (2018)), we aggregate the ethnic classifications into 13 ethnic groups from the 41
groups reported in the census. These 13 ethnic groups are Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kamba, Luo,
Luhya, Maasai, Coastal, Embu, Kisii, Meru, Somali, Turkana-Samburu, and Other (which
are Other Africans, Arabs, Asians, Non-Africans).
Elections and Electoral Violence
Data on the frequency of elections and electoral violence were compiled from various country-
A.28
specific Human Rights Reports published by the U.S. Department of State. Reported inci-
dents of election-related violence were then categorized on the basis of timing − i.e., whether
they occurred before, during, or after the election period and within the same calendar year.
Violence “any time” reported in Figure 1 encompasses all three categories. The Human
Rights Reports are prepared by State Department officials from information provided by a
variety of sources including U.S. and foreign government officials, victims of alleged human
rights abuses, academic and congressional publications, press reports, and reports from rel-
evant international organizations and nongovernmental organizations. Reports are available
for each year for each country for the years 1993 through 2018. Reports provide sufficient
information about the most recent election preceding the year 1993, thus allowing us to
assess the years 1990-1992, as well. Consequently, our data set, contains information on the
number and type of elections and electoral violence for the years 1990-2018. To classify elec-
tions as non-violent or violent, we use the definition provided in Straus and Taylor (2009).37
We include violence before the elections (during campaigning, whether there were violent
protests or harassment of political figures), during the elections (protests, harassment or
other violence on election day), and after the elections (whether there was any disturbance
after the results were announced). Elections can belong to one of four categories:
• No violence in connection with the election, coded as 0.
• Violent harassment: is defined by Straus and Taylor (2009) on page 10 as events “indi-
cated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition
newspapers being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents”,
these type of elections are coded as 1.
• Violent repression: is defined by Straus and Taylor (2009) on page 10 as events “in-
dicated by long-term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent
intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture”, these type of
elections are coded as 2.
• Highly violent election: is defined by Straus and Taylor (2009) on page 11 as events
that are “repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths”, these
type of elections are coded as 3.
37Straus and Taylor (2009) lists cases with 20 or more deaths during elections. For comparison, Blattman
and Miguel (2010) define civil wars as internal conflicts that count more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single
year and civil conflicts as those that count at least 25 deaths per year. The International Foundation for Elec-
toral Systems (IFES) defines “election violence [a]s any harm or threat to any person or property involved in
the election process, or to the election process itself, during the election period” (see http://www.ifes.org).
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We classify an election as violent if it is in category 1, 2, or 3 (Straus and Taylor (2009) uses
only categories 2 and 3 as violent). There is no objective line between categories 0-1-2, each
election has to be assessed based on the information given in the Human Rights Reports.
We use our best judgement to classify the events. In some cases our assessment is different
from that of Straus and Taylor (2009).
For each African country, we assess whether there was an election in the country,
the type of the election (national, presidential, parliamentary, legislative, regional, local, by-
election), and whether there was any electoral violence. We analyze national, presidential,
parliamentary, or legislative elections only. We believe that these nationwide elections are
of interest to the type of market instability our paper focuses on, also, the sub-national
level elections might not be as thoroughly assessed in the Human Rights Reports, hence we
are not confident that we have knowledge of all of these sub-national elections. Following
Straus and Taylor (2009), presidential and parliamentary/legislative elections not held at
the same time are counted as two elections for the same year if there was more than three
months gap between them. If they were held within three months of each other, we count
them as one election. Lastly, Human Rights Reports for 1999−2018 are available online:
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (accessed October 1, 2019). Older reports are
available on archived websites, for example, for 1998 see: https://1997-2001.state.gov/
global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/98hrp_report_toc.html.
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